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Abstract 
Decoupled payments are lump-sum income transfers to farm operators that do not
depend on current production, factor use, or commodity prices. Such payments are not
currently constrained by global trade rules, but many countries argue that they distort
production and trade and that their use should be limited. This report examines the
U.S. experience with decoupled payments in its Production Flexibility Contracts pro-
gram under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996. The
payments have improved the well-being of recipient farm households, enabling them to
comfortably increase spending, savings, investments, and leisure but with minimal dis-
tortion of U.S. agricultural production and trade. However, farm operators may retain
as little as 40 percent of program benefits due to higher land rents. While commercial
farms received the largest share of decoupled payments, they rent in over two-thirds of
their program acres, which suggests that a sizable portion of their program benefits
may be passed through to nonfarming landowners. 
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Summary
Decoupled payments are lump-sum income transfers to farm operators that do not
depend on current production, factor use, or commodity prices and for which eligibility
is based on fixed, historical criteria. Such payments are not presently constrained by
global trade rules, but many countries argue that they distort production and trade and
that their use should be limited. Further constraints on domestic support, which
includes decoupled payments, are being discussed in the Doha Development Agenda,
the new multilateral round of trade negotiations. 
This report examines the U.S. experience with decoupled payments in its Production
Flexibility Contracts (PFC) program under the Federal Agriculture Improvement and
Reform (FAIR) Act of 1996. PFCs were fixed, annual payments to farm operators
based on qualified acres historically enrolled in commodity programs. The payments
totaled about $36 billion from 1996 to 2002. Decoupled payments are being continued
in the 2002 U.S. Farm Security and Rural Investment Act.
U.S. decoupled payments improved the well-being of participating households,
enabling them to increase their consumption, savings, investment, and leisure, but with
minimal distortion of U.S. agricultural production or trade. However, farm operators in
aggregate may have retained as little as 40 percent of program benefits, with the
remainder passed through to landowners. The low retention rate is due to rising rental
costs on the large share of rented acres in the PFC program. While commercial farms
received the largest share of decoupled payments, they rented in over two-thirds of
their program acres and therefore had the highest potential rate of pass-through of pro-
gram benefits to nonfarming landowners. 
The potential for payments to lead to more investment in agriculture is a key concern
of U.S. trade partners. This study finds that participating farm households exercise
considerable choice in the allocation of their savings across their investment portfolios.
Decoupled payments do not change the level or variability of market returns and there-
fore provide no incentives for additional farm investment. Although payments can alle-
viate credit constraints and reduce borrowing costs, allowing some farmers to increase
farm investment, this report found no evidence at the aggregate level of increased
onfarm investment stemming from decoupled payments. 
The study includes a simulation of a permanent program of decoupled payments and
finds that decoupled PFC payments would have a negligible impact on agricultural
investment and production in the long run; however, household consumption and off-
farm investment would increase. Payments increase land asset values by about 8 per-
cent. If payments are assumed to be fully invested in agriculture, which could occur if
all farmers are credit constrained or recipients’ investment portfolios are limited to
agriculture, the payments would increase aggregate onfarm investment by less than
two-tenths of 1 percent and increase aggregate agricultural production by a maximum
of one-tenth percent in the long run.
The analysis draws primarily on the most recent Agricultural Resource Management
Survey (ARMS) data on households that received PFC payments to describe and ana-
lyze patterns of land ownership and rental, consumption, savings, investment, and
onfarm and off-farm employment. Introduction
Domestic agricultural subsidies were brought under the
discipline of global trade rules for the first time in the
Uruguay Round of the General Agreement on Tariffs and
Trade (GATT), which concluded in 1993. In order to
reduce the spillover of domestic support onto world
markets, GATT members agreed to limit expenditures on
domestic agricultural subsidies, with some important
exemptions (table 1). One is decoupled income support
to producers. This support is defined in the Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) as pay-
ments that are financed by the government (taxpayers)
rather than by consumers, are not related to current pro-
duction, factor use, or prices, and for which eligibility
criteria are defined by a fixed, historical base period.
(See box on URAA criteria for exemption of domestic
support from expenditure limits.) The exemption of
decoupled payments provides members of the World
Trade Organization (WTO)—the successor organization
to the GATT—with the flexibility to transfer income to
their agricultural producers, but in a manner presumed to
have minimal potential to distort production and trade. 
Global agricultural trade negotiations resumed in March
2000 in Geneva. They have since been subsumed into
the full round of trade negotiations launched in Qatar in
November 2001 by the WTO. The new round, called the
Doha Development Agenda, will continue the global
agricultural policy reform process begun in the Uruguay
Round. The negotiations are expected to address fur-
ther constraints on domestic support and may include
discussion of the criteria under which some policies
should continue to be exempt from expenditure limits. 
The United States adopted decoupled payments, called
Production Flexibility Contracts (PFCs), in the Federal
Agricultural Improvement and Reform (FAIR) Act of
1996. PFCs were considered to be a minimally distort-
ing means to transfer income to U.S. agricultural pro-
ducers. The United States will continue to use decou-
pled payments, now called “direct payments,” in the
2002 Farm Security and Rural Investment (FSRI) Act.
Decoupled payments are also used by Mexico, which
introduced fixed, annual payments to eligible producers
in its PROCAMPO program, initiated in 1993. Recent
policy reforms in Japan and the proposed reforms in
the European Union increase the market orientation of
their farm sectors, although subsidies in these coun-
tries continue to be linked to current production or
prices and are therefore not decoupled. 
For decades, economists have proposed decoupling
support to agriculture as a way to facilitate agricultural
reform (Beard and Swinbank). Decoupled support is
advocated because it does not distort relative prices
and therefore does not attract additional resources into
the sector. In addition, payments that do not fluctuate
with production or prices avoid the production distor-
tions arising when programs act like insurance policies
against low prices (Hennessy). 
However, many countries have taken the position that,
based on the experience with the URAA, the implemen-
tation of a minimally distorting payment has proven to
be impossible. There are many conditions under which
lump-sum payments can lead to production impacts.
This outcome depends on certain assumptions about
farmer tolerance for risk, farmer expectations about
future payments, and the efficiency of factor—land,
labor, and capital—markets (e.g., Tielu and Roberts;
European Commission; OECD). Some countries argue
that these market conditions exist and lump-sum pay-
ments therefore increase aggregate production.
Consequently, they argue for lump-sum payments to
face similar expenditure limits as traditional, distort-
ing, commodity-based farm subsidies. 
This report examines the U.S. experience with decoupled
payments in its PFC program during 1996-2002 from the
perspective of trade policy. It asks whether the decoupled
payments have distorted U.S. agricultural production and
therefore trade. Using data on farm households that
participated in the PFC program, we analyze the
effects of decoupled payments by looking at how the
payments increased the income and wealth of partici-
pants and change farm household consumption, sav-
ing, investment, and work. These decisions can result
in changes in the supply of resources to agriculture
and in aggregate agricultural production.
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Rules From the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture on the
Exemption of Domestic Support From Expenditure Limits 
The Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture specifies criteria that green-box domestic support must meet in order to be
exempted from expenditure limits. These criteria address program design and implementation. Many types of domestic
support are exempted in addition to decoupled payments, including extension services, pest and disease control, stock
holding for domestic food security, domestic food aid, disaster relief, and environmental programs.  All exempted domestic
support must meet the same general criteria:
• Support must be provided through a publicly funded government program.
• The support may not have the effect of providing price support to producers.
Different specific criteria exist for each type of program exempted from domestic support limits, reflecting their broadly
differing objectives. For example, environmental payments must require specific production methods or use of inputs related to
well-defined environmental goals and may only compensate for additional costs of compliance, in addition to meeting the
general criteria for exemption. For decoupled income support to be exempt, the following specific criteria must be met:
• Eligibility must be defined by some clearly defined criteria in a fixed base period.
• The amount of the payment must not be related to the type or volume of production, prices, or factor employment in any
year after the base period.
• No production shall be required in order to receive the payment.
Source: Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, Annex 2, WTO.
Table 1—Treatment of domestic agricultural support in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture 
Category General criteria General examples of policies Examples of U.S. programs
Exempt domestic  Measures must be financed by  Direct payments to farmers  Production Flexibility Contracts
support (green box) the government rather than  that do not depend on current 
consumers and must not provide production decisions or prices;
price support to producers disaster assistance; and 
government programs on 
Specific criteria are defined for  research, extension, and 
general government services,  pest and disease control
public stockholding, domestic 
food aid, decoupled income  
support, and other programs
Exempt direct  Production-limiting programs  Direct payments to producers,  U.S. deficiency payments 
payments under must be based on fixed area or  linked to production of specific  program with set-asides under 
production-limiting yields, or cover 85 percent or  crops, but which impose  1990 farm legislation
programs (blue box) less of the base level of  offsetting limits on output
production or head of livestock
Nonexempt support  Market price support,  Market price supports, and  Marketing loan benefits, 
(amber box) nonexempt direct payments  output and input subsidies Market Loss Assistance 
and any other subsidies not  payments (1998-2002)
specifically exempted are 
subject to reduction 
commitments
Note: Exempt domestic support, exempt direct payments, and nonexempt support are the categories of support in the WTO Agreement on
Agriculture and correspond to the popular names of green, blue, and amber boxes, respectively.
Source: Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture, WTO.Decoupled Payments as Income
Transfers: Conceptual
Framework of the Study
This section presents the conceptual framework of the
analysis, explaining how income transfer payments in
general change household income, wealth, risk attitudes,
and expectations, and lead to changes in household
consumption, saving, investment, and work. We also
describe our methodology for analyzing the impacts on
households and U.S. agricultural production.
Decoupled Payments: Fundamentally 
Different From Coupled Payments 
Decoupled payments are fundamentally different from
the traditional, “coupled” commodity programs that have
historically provided most income support to U.S. agri-
cultural producers. Decoupled payments are fixed income
transfers that do not subsidize production activities,
inputs, or practices. They are “lump-sum” transfers
because no production decision or change in market
price can alter the size of the payment due to eligible
producers. This program design effectively cuts the link
between payments, production, and prices, and makes
the payments a direct transfer of income to the farm
household. In contrast, coupled subsidies directly affect
production decisions by changing the prices received by
the producer for commodities or the prices of inputs,
either of which change the marginal returns from pro-
duction. Price signals attract resources into subsidized
sectors and lead to higher levels of production and
lower world prices. Some types of coupled programs
also impose supply controls, which raise commodity
prices for consumers. (See box, “Increased Market
Orientation of World Agriculture.”) 
Income Transfers and Income 
and Wealth Effects 
Income transfers are not unique to agriculture. Many
U.S. programs are designed to redistribute income and
wealth to specific recipients. Most of these are targeted
to household socioeconomic characteristics, such as
poverty, unemployment, and old age. Research on
social welfare programs has addressed several issues
of relevance for the U.S. decoupled farm program.
Foremost, it has focused attention on the ways that
changes in income and wealth affect household con-
sumption, savings, and work effort (Atkinson and
Stiglitz; Myles; Danziger et al.). 
Transfer payments are one component of household
income, which can also include farm and nonfarm
wages, interest and dividends, and gifts and bequests
(fig. 1). Similar to other sources of income, a household
makes decisions about the expenditure of its govern-
ment benefit on consumption or savings, taking into
account its tax liabilities. In general, these expenditure
decisions can be understood within a lifetime planning
framework, with households choosing to consume the
payment now or to save and invest it to pay for future
consumption. The consumption and savings tradeoff is
influenced by the characteristics of the household such
as age, its subjective preferences (such as risk atti-
tudes), and the expected yield on investments. 
A transfer payment immediately increases a house-
hold’s ability to both consume and save. Market
expectations about the size and the duration of future
income transfers are reflected in the household’s asset
values, and consequently its wealth. Higher wealth
also influences current consumption and savings. It
increases the household’s propensity to consume cur-
rent income by reducing its need for savings to finance
future consumption. Consumption includes both goods
and leisure. Government transfer payments in effect
make leisure, like other goods, more affordable. They
increase the value of leisure relative to the marginal
value of additional wage earnings and in theory lead to
a reduction in hours worked. 
A household’s savings represent its plan to pay for
consumption in the future. In the lifecycle framework,
a household typically consumes a large share of its
income in its early years, when income is still low.
Households have a higher savings rate in midlife,
when earnings typically peak (although the level of
consumption can be highest in these years as well).
The savings rate declines in later years when incomes
fall and hours of work are reduced. In addition, when a
household’s income has high year-to-year variability, it
has an incentive to accumulate precautionary savings
for short-term consumption smoothing, allowing it to
maintain some threshold consumption when income is
low. A household typically allocates its savings across
an investment asset portfolio, and its savings rate is
sensitive to the expected (risk- and tax-adjusted) rate
of return on its investments. 
Changes in income and wealth can also change a
household’s tolerance for risk. Farmers’ risk aversion
is sometimes argued to affect production decisions,
and wealth-induced increases in risk tolerance are
argued to influence production levels, input use, or
crop mix. Instead, from a household’s perspective,
changes in risk tolerance due to an income transfer are
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Many countries in addition to the United States have reformed
their farm subsidies in an effort to increase the market orienta-
tion of their agricultural sectors. In recent years, countries have
introduced a wide variety of domestic programs that have less-
ened the degree of producers’ price insulation. Only subsidies
that do not depend on current prices, factor use, or production
can be considered fully decoupled from farm production deci-
sions. Most countries have achieved a greater degree of market
orientation but their subsidies still depend on either current
price or current production. 
Domestic subsidies are compared here according to their links
or “coupling” to current prices or production. Subsidies fully
decoupled from price are fixed payments made irrespective of
market price conditions. Payments fully decoupled from price,
such as EU compensatory payments, are still essentially cou-
pled if current production is required in order to receive bene-
fits. Japan has moved to partially de-link its support from cur-
rent prices by basing subsidy levels on recent moving averages
of market prices. Payments fully coupled to price, such as the
U.S. counter-cyclical payments, insulate producers from price
signals because payments increase when prices fall and vice
versa. U.S. counter-cyclical payments are decoupled from cur-
rent production, but most countries typically require some cur-
rent production for households to receive price subsidies. 
Some coupled programs allow planting flexibility—farmers can
choose crop mixes and their program participation. Farmers’
resource allocation therefore becomes, to some extent, a “tilling
for benefits” decision. When fully coupled price subsidies are
combined with rigid crop mix requirements, as in the 1990 Act
deficiency payments, there is no room at all for market price
signals or program benefits to allocate resources. U.S. farmers’
base production had to be planted to the same crop for which
they had base acres, or farmers would forego benefits. The
“normal flex acres” (15 percent of base) in the 1990 Act were not
eligible for deficiency payments, but loan benefits remained avail-
able if the acres were planted in a program crop. The “optional
flex acres” (an additional 10 percent of base) in the 1990 Act
also allowed farmers to plant any crop. Deficiency payments
were foregone if this acreage was switched to an alternative crop,
although producers did not lose this acreage from their base. 
“Decoupling” can be defined in terms of the actual impact of
the program on production levels or the way a subsidy program
is implemented. Implementation rules offer a neutral way to com-
pare farm programs, and they are the basis for WTO criteria on
exemption from expenditure limits. Actual production impacts
can vary by country for reasons that are not related to program
design but are instead related to local market conditions.
Market conditions can cause even fully decoupled payments to
have supply impacts, but these conditions are outside the con-
trol of policymakers. In Mexico, for instance, the PROCAMPO
payments have significantly affected agricultural investment
because they have enabled credit-constrained farmers to invest
onfarm (Sadoulet, de Janvry, and Davis). Although this
increased investment can lead to production impacts, Mexico
notifies the payments as “green box” compliant to the WTO
because of the program’s implementation rules.
The description of programs’ links to production and prices in
the table is based on a stylized representation of complex pro-
grams. Programs often have multiple components with different
links to production or prices. For example, components of U.S.
1990 Act deficiency payments had different eligibility rules,
and only some appear in the table.
Increased market orientation of domestic support: Subsidies’ links to current prices and production
Links to production
Full planting Full planting
flexibility, flexibility, Planting flexibility Limited or no
Links to prices including idling excluding idling within program crops planting flexibility 
Payment  U.S. PFC and U.S. 2002  Mexican PROCAMPO EU compensatory and 
not linked to  Act direct payments set-aside payments, Japan 
current price payments for mountain and 
hilly areas, Japan area 
payments for other crops 
grown on riceland and for 
manufactured milk
Payment  Japan income stabilization 
linked to  programs, Japan vegetable 
recent trends  and milk price stabilization 
in market price programs
Payment  U.S. counter-cyclicals,  Canadian NISA EU intervention prices,  U.S. 1990 Act 
linked to  U.S. Market Loss  U.S marketing loan  deficiency 
current price Assistance benefits, Japan  payments—
deficiency payment for  optional flex and 
beef calves, soybeans,  nonflex acres
and hogs
Increased Market Orientation of World Agriculturelikely to affect all of its decisions about consumption,
savings, and work effort, and its allocation of savings
across its investment portfolio, not just its decisions
about farm production.
The income and wealth effects of transfer payments on
households can lead to second-round effects when
payments redistribute income among households with
different preferences. These preferences can influence
the level and composition of aggregate demand and
supply, savings, and investment and the rate of eco-
nomic growth. Farm payments, for example, increase
the savings of a population with a propensity to invest
on farm compared with most taxpayers. Also, changes
in farmers’ liquidity may ease conditions under which
credit is supplied to the sector. In addition, distortion
to the general economy can result from the taxation
required to finance the income transfer and to the costs
of program administration.1
Despite the similarities between decoupled farm subsi-
dies and some of the major U.S. income transfer pro-
grams, the programs also differ in important ways.
PFCs target current farm operators instead of general
socioeconomic characteristics and so by design have a
link to a production sector of the economy. PFCs also
transfer financial resources to households that on
average have incomes that are comparable to those of
the general population, and they increase the net worth
of those households. In 2001, the average income of
households receiving PFC payments was $59,620,
slightly higher than the average U.S. household income
of $58,208 (DeNavas-Walt and Cleveland). Farm
households, despite having similar incomes, have
much greater wealth (Mishra et al.). The net worth of
participant farm households averaged $660,450 in
1999, compared with $282,500 for all U.S. households
in 1998—or less than half that of farm households
receiving PFCs (Kennickell et al., 2000).
Decoupled subsidies also differ from many other U.S.
income transfer programs because eligibility for PFC
payments is transferable. Payments are linked to the
operation of base acres, and payment rights can be
acquired through buying or renting base acreage.
Participants in base-acre purchase and rental markets
are in effect bidding on expected benefits from the
payments associated with that acreage, and changes in
the asset value of base acres are reflected in the wealth
of participants.
Market Distortions 
Some of the arguments made about the production
effects of decoupled payments are based on the exis-
tence of “market failures,” which are inefficiencies,
rigidities, or incomplete information in capital, insur-
ance, and labor markets in agriculture. Market failures
make it more likely that a farm household receiving
Economic Research Service/USDA Decoupled Payments: Household Income Transfers in Contemporary U.S. Agriculture/AER-822 ✥  5
Figure 1
The flow of household income and expenditures
Goods Leisure
Consumption
Farm assets Nonfarm assets
Savings Taxes
Expenditures
Choices influenced by household
characteristics and preferences,
including age and risk attitudes;
interest rates; and tax consequences
Income
Farm and nonfarm wages, interest and dividends,
government transfers, gifts, and bequests 
1For a recent perspective on the optimal taxation problem and farm sub-
sidies, see Moschini and Sckokai's analysis of the taxation problem for
small and large open economies. Coady and Harris analyzed the welfare
costs associated with funding Mexico's PROGRESA cash transfer program.lump sums will allocate the additional liquidity to its
farm business rather than allocate the payments across
all economic activities. 
One distortion, for example, occurs when credit-con-
strained farmers lack access to capital at competitive
rates and conditions, perhaps because banks have
insufficient information about the actual credit risk
posed by an individual. This can leave some producers
unable to invest in profitable farm production activi-
ties. Increased access to capital from decoupled pay-
ments might allow such farmers to increase farm
investment and expand agricultural production
(Sadoulet et al.; Rude). Likewise, rural labor market
rigidities may influence how a recipient household
allocates its labor and leisure as its income and wealth
increase (Vercammen). For example, if work schedules
in onfarm or off-farm jobs are rigid, farm households
wanting to cut total labor hours may find it feasible to
do so only by eliminating one job entirely rather than
reducing hours worked.
Although not addressed in this report, taxes related to
income, capital gains, social security, and bequests
can also affect production by influencing household
response to the income transfer. In the United States,
Federal income, self-employment, and estate and gift
taxes are the most important taxes affecting farmers
(Durst and Monke). Historically, U.S. tax policies
provided incentives for farmers’ investment in depre-
ciable capital. Reforms in 1986 significantly reduced
these incentives by lengthening the depreciation peri-
ods and eliminating investment tax credits, but the
Taxpayer Relief Act of 1997 again increased incen-
tives to invest in farm capital. The 2001 tax reform
gradually reduces Federal income taxes over a 10-
year period and suspends the estate tax. While the
2001 reform was not specifically aimed at farmers,
they will benefit from one or more of its provisions
(Monke and Durst).
These market imperfections may be correlated with
the scale of farming operations. In addition to domes-
tic concerns about farm structure—the role of large
and small farms in agriculture—economies of scale
could also affect the efficiency of the sector. If all
farms or only small farms are affected by credit con-
straints, decoupled payments may have no effect on
structure. But if only large farms are credit con-
strained, then payments may give them the necessary
liquidity to achieve further consolidation. Whether
payments have allowed recipients to achieve scale
economies is not known.
Methodology 
We analyze the effects of decoupled payments on agri-
cultural production and trade by looking at ways that the
payments can provide an incentive to increase farm
production. Production is affected when the payments
that increase the income and wealth of participants
change farm households’ consumption, saving, invest-
ment, and hours worked. These household decisions can
change the resources supplied to agriculture and lead to
changes in aggregate agricultural production and trade.
Knowledge about U.S. farm households has been sub-
stantially increased by Farm Costs and Returns Surveys
(FCRS) and, since 1996, by the annual Farm Business
and Farm Operator Household Data survey, a component
of the Agricultural Resource Management Survey
(ARMS). ARMS is USDA’s primary vehicle for data
collection on a broad range of issues about agricultural
resource use and costs, farm financial conditions, and the
characteristics of farm operators and their households.
ARMS captures the diversity in U.S. farm households,
and includes both program participant and nonpartici-
pant farms. (See box, “Diversity in U.S. Agriculture.”)
Many of the survey questions asked of farm house-
holds change annually. Therefore, the survey results
described in this report are frequently identified as
being based on a specific year of ARMS data.
This report synthesizes the findings of three analytical
approaches. First, we analyze ARMS data to describe
recipients’ characteristics and financial situations,
including patterns of land ownership and rental, con-
sumption, saving, investments, and onfarm and off-
farm labor force participation. These parameters are
then used to describe the household allocation of
income such as decoupled payments, and the distribu-
tion of PFC benefits. Second, we use cross-section
data from ARMS to empirically estimate the impacts
of decoupled payments on farm households’ on- and
off-farm labor supply and leisure hours. 
Third, to estimate the impact of the decoupled payments
on agricultural production, we simulate the program
using a dynamic, intertemporal computable general
equilibrium (CGE) model.2 This type of economywide
model provides a consistent framework that integrates
U.S. farm household decisions on consumption, savings,
and investment, with agricultural production. The model
also incorporates one of the “distorted market” scenarios,
that of farm households restricted to investing only in
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2See appendix for a description of the model. agriculture, and compares the impact of decoupled
payments on production relative to when households
allocate savings across diversified investment portfolios.
Our approach has some data and methodological limita-
tions. Foremost, our descriptive analysis assumes that
farm households allocate their decoupled payments in
the same way they allocate their total income. But their
overall propensity to consume is likely an average of dif-
ferent propensities to consume from various income
sources (Thaler). These other sources may include wages
and retained business earnings from farm and nonfarm
businesses, pensions, interest, as well as government
payments. Carriker et al. find that farm families have
higher propensities to consume from their relatively pre-
dictable government payments and off-farm incomes
than from their more volatile farm income, presumably
because the former reduce the need for precautionary
savings. In addition, households’ allocation of an addi-
tional dollar of income, or their marginal propensities
to save, invest, and work, may differ from their overall
average allocation of income and hours. 
ARMS data provide a rich cross-section survey of the
farm sector, including program participation data.
Panel surveys, by tracking households over time, can
show more directly (compared with cross-section sur-
veys such as ARMS) how individuals adjust to eco-
nomic shocks, including policy shocks. However,
cross-section data have important advantages over
panel data. First, cross-section data can be used to
show the largely stable lifecycle patterns of consump-
tion, income, and wealth as described in this report.
Second, cross-section surveys such as ARMS excel at
presenting a balanced representation of contemporary
agriculture, while panel surveys must take special care
to remain balanced as their survey population
declines. Third, no panel currently matches ARMS for
breadth and depth of farm business and farm house-
hold detail. 
Finally, the CGE simulation provides a stylized analy-
sis of the impacts of the PFC payments. In particular,
there is a single aggregate agricultural sector in the
model. 
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Diversity in U.S. Agriculture (Participant and Nonparticipant Farms)
Participation in government programs is not universal within the U.S. agricultural sector because not all farms have 
historically produced feed grains, wheat, rice, or cotton. In fact, in 2001, only about 21 percent of the 2.1 million 
U.S. farms operated acreage either currently or formerly devoted to these crops. U.S. farms differ widely in what they
produce, their size, technologies, resources, and business arrangements. One way to show this diversity is by looking at
three classes of farms (see table).
Commercial farms are those farms with more than $250,000 in annual sales. These farms made up about 10 percent of
all U.S. farms in 2001, but 72 percent of the total agricultural output because their farms tend to be larger, with an aver-
age of 750 acres harvested. Household incomes are greatest for this group, averaging $130,887. Intermediate farms
have sales of less than $250,000 but are operated by someone for whom farming is the main occupation. This group
made up 31 percent of all farms and 22 percent of the agricultural output in 2001, harvesting 189 acres on average.
Household incomes, at $40,272, were less than a third of households with commercial farms. The remaining 59 percent
of “rural-residence” farms are smaller, harvesting an average of only 33 acres of cropland in 2001. Incomes of rural-res-
idence farms averaged $69,423.
Characteristics of farm diversity 
Average Share of
household Average farm type Average
Share of Share of income from acres in that received PFC
Farm class all farms production all sources production PFC payments payment
----------Percent---------- Dollars Number Percent Dollars
Commercial 10 72 130,887 750 45 25,957
Intermediate 31 22 40,272 189 34 6,713
Rural-residence 59 6 69,423 33 11 2,259
Total 100 100 64,465 149 21 9,176
Note: PFC payment averaged only over participant farms.
Source: ARMS, 2001.Implementation of the U.S.
Production Flexibility
Contract Program
In this section, we describe the goals and operation of
the U.S. PFC program. We also discuss some of the
implications of its program design for the creation of
wealth and the distribution of payment benefits within
and outside the agricultural sector.
Program Goals
Decoupled payments were introduced in the United
States with the 1996 FAIR Act. The payments, called
Production Flexibility Contract payments, were fixed,
annual lump-sum installments totaling about $36 bil-
lion over 1996-2002. PFCs have also been called
Agricultural Market Transition Assistance (AMTA)
payments. PFC payments accounted for an average of
9 percent of net farm income over 1996-2001. 
The decoupling of U.S. farm support was complemen-
tary to the market liberalization principles developed
in the Uruguay Round, but the motivation for the
FAIR Act was due almost entirely to domestic consid-
erations (Young and Westcott; Orden et al.; Tweeten
and Zulauf). These included the large Federal budget
deficit, a growing dissatisfaction with the restrictive
program rules linked to supply management (complet-
ing a trend since 1985 toward increased planting flexi-
bility), and producer demands for more flexibility to
respond to world market conditions. In addition, favor-
able commodity market conditions in 1996 helped to
reduce farmers’ opposition to the planned reduction in
government payments in the FAIR Act. 
Implementation of the decoupled program was relatively
straightforward. Operators of base acres were given
predetermined lump-sum payments. Base acres were
fields previously enrolled in supply management pro-
grams for wheat, rice, corn, barley, oats, sorghum, and
cotton. Payment amounts varied according to field-
specific historical crop production and per acre yields. 
The contracts allowed almost full planting flexibility, but
some restrictions were placed on land use. Most impor-
tant, the land could not be put to a nonagricultural use,
such as a residential or industrial use. However, the land
could be fallowed, converted from cropland to pasture or
forest, or planted to any crop (except for fruits and veg-
etables unless it was used that way in the past). Partici-
pants also had to comply with conservation and wetland
provisions. Payments were made directly to operators
of program acres, including tenants, not to landowners.
In the case of share-crop tenancy arrangements, pay-
ments were split between tenants and landowners on
the basis of the tenancy agreement. Program eligibility
was transferable with the sale or lease of base acres. 
Nearly all eligible producers signed up their qualified
acreage, with over 211 million acres, or 99 percent of
eligible acreage, enrolled in the program. Eligible
acreage was about half of the total 434 million
cropped acres at the time.
By design, the lump-sum amount given to producers was
not related to current production. However, because the
lump sum was based on past production levels, there
was a strong correlation between farm size and payment
levels (fig. 2). For example, the largest farms (classified
as “commercial” farms in the USDA farm typology,
with over $250,000 in sales) made up only 20 percent
of all recipients, but due to large acreage, they received
over half the payments in 2001. At the other end of the
spectrum, “residential farms” make up about a third of
the recipients but because of their small acreage, they
received only 8 percent of the payments. Intermediate
farms, on the other hand, were more proportionately
represented, making up 48 percent of the recipients
and receiving 36 percent of the payments. 
In 1996 and 1997, decoupled PFC payments made up
nearly all the direct government support to producers
(some operators received conservation payments and
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Figure 2
Commercial farms are fewer but account for over 
half of PFC payments and two-thirds of production 










Farm typepayments for minor commodities). Over the life of the
FAIR Act, however, the decline in world commodity
prices led to increased use of marketing loans which
compensate producers for low prices, and the provi-
sion of additional, ad hoc government support to agri-
culture. These reduced the role of decoupled payments
and resulted in subsidies linked to current commodity
prices and/or production levels having a larger share in
total payments to agriculture (fig. 3). 
Decoupled Payments Continued in 
the 2002 FSRI Act
In the 2002 FSRI Act, decoupled subsidies, now called
“direct payments” will total about $5 billion annually,
including the addition of oilseeds and peanuts to the
program. Other payments to farmers will include
counter-cyclical payments and marketing loan benefits.
For direct payments, the FSRI allows farmers to elect
to update their acres from the 1981-85 planting history
used in the FAIR Act to a more recent (1998-2001)
planting history or keep their existing bases. Yields
associated with direct payments are kept unchanged,
except for oilseeds and peanuts. 
Market for Base Acres and Decoupled Payments
Land markets have a unique role in determining the
value and distribution of decoupled payments within
U.S. agriculture because, by design, payments are made
to operators of base acres enrolled in the program. Land
prices reflect expectations about current and future
returns from agricultural production, government 
payments (including future government payments), and
the value of land in alternative uses (for example, resi-
dential or commercial use). Land rental prices reflect
only the expected returns over the rental period, and in
the case of farmland, this will include its value in agri-
cultural production plus the value of government pay-
ments. Land rents also reflect transaction costs for
landlords and tenants incurred in negotiating leases. 
Both coupled and decoupled subsidies are capitalized
into land values and rents, but the pathways are different.
A coupled subsidy, such as a per unit commodity price
support, motivates commodity production in order to
qualify for and to maximize benefits. The subsidy aug-
ments market returns from the sale of a commodity,
which in turn increases returns to the labor, capital, and
land employed in its production. In the short run, labor
and capital can be attracted into the sector by the
increase in wages or capital returns. In contrast, land is
in comparatively limited supply and is difficult to sub-
stitute for, so its price is bid up the most. Land therefore
typically captures much of the benefit of a production
subsidy, although returns to all inputs to production are
likely to increase somewhat. At the same time, expanded
production may lead to falling market prices and to
rising costs of intermediate inputs. Lower commodity
prices benefit consumers, although they increase sub-
sidy costs for taxpayers in a market price support pro-
gram. Increased intermediate input prices tend to
reduce the net value of the subsidy to producers. 
Unlike coupled subsidies, decoupled payments are pre-
determined lump-sum payments. Since they do not
change commodity or input prices or require current
production, they do not create incentives to alter produc-
tion to acquire or maximize the subsidy. They conse-
quently do not interfere with how markets determine
prices and do not affect variable input costs or market
returns to farm land, labor, or capital. Buyers and renters
can acquire the right to the fixed, known stream of
decoupled payments simply by owning or renting pro-
gram acres. In theory, the payments can be almost fully
capitalized into land values, adjusting for administrative
costs of the program and the buyer’s subjective discount
rate on future benefits. Note, however, that land capi-
talization of decoupled payments means that tenant-
operators may not benefit from the payments (see box,
“Payment Eligibility: Alternatives to Base Acres”).
Some contend that land capitalization reduces the
competitiveness of U.S. producers by inflating the cost
of land for new entrants and others renting or buying.
However, their receipt of the payments compensates
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Figure 3
PFC payments account for one-third of payments 
to farmers over the FAIR Act
$ billion











Source: Agricultural Outlook, Nov. 2002.for higher land costs. Renters and new buyers who
receive PFCs are largely no worse off than if the pro-
grams did not exist at all, as long as their subsidy
expectations continue to be met. 
Land Rentals Reduce Benefits of Decoupled
Payments for U.S. Farm Operators
About 60 percent of the acreage enrolled in the PFC
program was rented in 1996. This rental rate was sig-
nificantly higher than rental rates for all farmland (42
percent), which includes base acres as well as other
cropland, wetlands, woodlands, and range land. Land
rental arrangements can extend over several years or
be as short as a single crop year, so that rents are pre-
sumably more reflective of short-term expectations
about commodity prices and government payments
than the sale price of land. 
Tenants who operate rented base acres can lose the bene-
fit of decoupled payments if landowners raise the rent or
alter the terms of the share rental agreement. This poten-
tial pass-through of program benefits to landlords can
dilute the payments’ benefits to producers. The active
rental market in program acres suggests that a sizable
portion of PFC payments may have been passed through
to nonoperator landowners. Between 1998 and 2001, the
price of renting cropland rose despite an overall decline
in commodity prices and overall receipts from crop
sales.3 Over the 1996-2001 period, the cost of buying
cropland also increased (fig. 4). An explanation for the
increased costs of renting or owning cropland, despite
declining market returns, is that renters and buyers are
bidding for rights to government payments. In compet-
itive land markets, the value of the known stream of
future decoupled payments can be fully captured by
those who own base acres. 
The cropland rental and value statistics may actually
understate the relative rate of increase in base acre
rents because they are based on all cropland, including
land that was not receiving government payments. 
Perfect pass-through of program benefits means that
100 percent of the payment is passed through to
landowners through increased rental rates. Assuming
perfect pass-through, the share of acres that is rented is
therefore the same as the share of the total PFC pro-
gram expenditure that is passed through to landlords.
If pass-through of rents has been perfect, tenants may
have passed through to landlords up to 60 percent, or
$3.084 billion of the $5.1 billion spent on PFCs in
1996 (table 2).
All sizes of farms rent in some base acres, but pass-
through is potentially greatest on commercial farms,
which receive most of the payments. Large farms 
rent up to two-thirds of the base acreage that they
operate, and therefore may pass through a larger share
of their payments to landlords than smaller farms. 
In fact, if pass-through is perfect, commercial farms
(with sales greater than $250,000) may ultimately
receive the same level of payment benefit as 
smaller farms.
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Payment Eligibility: Alternatives to Base Acres 
A payment that avoids being bid into the price of land may be desirable to some, but all payments involve some tradeoff
between maintaining their linkage to farming and being divorced from production decisions. Eligibility for decoupled
payments could be attached to inputs or characteristics other than land. For example, as an alternative to base acres, a
stipend could be paid to individuals who operated farms in some fixed base period. Allowing these producers to move
into other occupations, including retirement, if it would benefit them economically would be important for minimizing
production distortions because it would allow them the flexibility to maximize their returns. Without this mobility, the
payments would be coupled. The payments would be fully capitalized if the rights to the stipend were transferable.
In 1996, Mexico considered transforming its PROCAMPO payments, an annual income transfer paid to farmers, into a
fully transferable, long-term bond in response to a rural credit crisis. Mexican farmers could sell the PROCAMPO bond
in financial markets for cash or use it to provide collateral for loans. The program was not implemented, partly because
of concern about the political viability of the program in the long term. If the transfer of bond ownership were allowed,
PROCAMPO benefits might have become payable to nonfarmer bond holders, weakening the rationale of the payments
as a farm support program. The European Commission is considering a program similar to the Mexican bond proposal
(Swinbank and Tangermann; Kelch, Hasha, and Normile).
3National-level cash rent estimates go back only to 1998, so they are not
shown in figure 4. Cash rents rose during 1996-2001 in many States,
including the Corn Belt States of Ohio, Indiana, Illinois, Iowa, and
Missouri (USDA, NASS, “Agricultural Cash Rents, 2001, Summary”).Land Values and Expectations
Some argue that expectations can effectively “couple”
income transfers to current production decisions by
creating expectations about future benefits. It is useful
to distinguish between expectations about changes in
the level of support and expectations about changes in
the rules of eligibility. 
Expectations of changes in payment rates or levels will
change expected wealth in a lump-sum fashion. The
current price of land reflects anticipated changes in
payment levels and therefore in the value of land
assets and the wealth level of current owners. These
expectations will then affect primarily household con-
sumption, savings, and work decisions. 
Expectations about changes in the terms of payment
eligibility can distort current production. For example,
beliefs that future payments will depend on a constant
crop mix create incentives to keep current base acres in
production of program crops rather than to take advan-
tage of the planting flexibility allowed by the program.
It should be noted, however, that farmers who took
advantage of planting flexibility in the 1996 FAIR Act
were not subject to any loss of their base acres in the
2002 FSRI update. More likely are expectations that lead
farmers to expand current acreage in program crops
beyond their existing base acres in order to “build base”
in anticipation of future base updating opportunities. 
Expectations about program benefits are no doubt a fac-
tor in farm production decisions, but it would be difficult
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Figure 4
Crop prices trended down and flattened over 1996-2001, but the cost of buying cropland went up 
over the same period
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Source: USDA, Agricultural Statistics, 2001.
Table 2—Potential pass-through of PFCs from tenants to landlords: Largest farms may pass through most
of their program benefits to landlords
Farm size/ PFC payments Share of operated base PFC payments PFC payments 
value of production received, 1996 acres that are owned, 1996 retained passed through
$ Million --------Percent-------- ------------------$ Million------------------
$9,999 or less 30 80 24 6
$10,000-$49,999 314 62 195 119
$50,000-$99,999 373 55 205 168
$100,000-$249,999 1,379 42 580 799
$250,000-$499,999 1,699 33 562 1,137
$500,000-$999,999 683 37 251 433
$1,000,000 or more 622 32 200 423
All farms 5,100 41 2,016 3,084
Note: Aggregate retention and pass-through data differ slightly from the aggregate rental rate due to different payment rates by class of farm.
Source: ARMS, 1996.to determine whether these effects are significant or even
measurable, and they are likely smaller than farmers’
expectations about market prices. Also, base building
benefits are arguably more heavily discounted without
consistent and predictable regulations for annual base
updating. As with the 1996 Act, annual updates are not
allowed in the 2002 Act, and base acreage and yield
selections are one-time occurrences. Furthermore, the
large share of rented acres in program base acres
would require coordination between tenants seeking to
maximize their current market returns and landlords
seeking to maximize program benefits, and would pre-
sumably be reflected in lower rents to tenants.   
Who Owns U.S. Farmland?
Since the ultimate beneficiaries of decoupled govern-
ment payments are likely those who own base acres
rather than those who rent them, there is a natural inter-
est in knowing more about who these owners are. Those
who rent out land include active farmers who choose to
rent out to another active farmer. To be considered an
active farmer, the farming operation must generate, or
have the potential to generate, sales (not including rental
income) of at least $1,000 per year. Owners can also be
“nonoperator landlords” who take neither a manage-
ment interest in the operation of the land they own nor
derive any income from any other farming operation.
Our knowledge about ownership of base acres is incom-
plete because many landowners are not operators and
therefore are not included in USDA surveys. ARMS data
identify ownership and rental of base acres only for
active farmers. The 1999 AELOS, or Agricultural Econ-
omics and Land Ownership Survey (USDA, NASS), is
an exception because it identifies characteristics of both
active-farmer and nonoperator landlords, but does not
distinguish their land ownership according to its status in
farm programs. Accordingly, our discussion of landowner
characteristics is drawn from AELOS, and therefore relates
to aggregate U.S. cropland, rather than program acres. 
According to AELOS, 35 percent of rented acres are
rented from one active farmer to another, while farm-
ers rent the other 65 percent from nonfarming land-
lords. AELOS data on nonoperator landlords’ residen-
cy show that many have links to the farm sector, in
that they are retired farmers, widowed spouses, or
heirs. Nonfarming landlords are usually local, with 85
percent living within 50 miles of the land they are
renting out, and 29 percent living on the farm itself.
Moreover, the average age of nonoperator landlords is
63 years, 10 years older than the average age of opera-
tors. These descriptive data suggest that cropland
rental arrangements are serving the needs of both ten-
ants (often large farms) wishing to increase the
acreage they control and landlords (often older farmers
themselves or other local individuals or families) who
prefer to rent out cropland than farm it themselves. 
A variety of ownership arrangements exists for land
rented out to active farmers. Individuals or some type of
family organization (either joint ownership, partnership,
or corporation) own most rented farmland. Nonfamily
partnerships, corporations, or some other type of organi-
zation own a small share of rented farmland (fig. 5).
12 ✥ Decoupled Payments: Household Income Transfers in Contemporary U.S. Agriculture/AER-822 Economic Research Service/USDA
Figure 5
Most landowners (both owner operators and nonoperators) are sole proprietor individuals or families






















Total cropland holdings = 213 million acres
Nonoperator landlords
Total cropland holdings = 221 million acresEffects of Decoupled Payments
on Household Consumption,
Savings, and Investment
Participating Farm Households Have Low
Rates of Consumption Out of Income
Households allocate their income to consumption, sav-
ings, and taxes. Consumption includes household spend-
ing on food and household supplies, rent and mortgage,
nonfarm transportation, and medical expenses. ARMS
data for 2001 show that, on average, farm households
receiving decoupled payments had relatively low con-
sumption expenditure shares, consuming less and likely
saving more out of their income than do nonfarm
households. PFC participants consumed $26,884 out of
pre-tax household income of nearly $59,620. In compar-
ison, all U.S. consumer units4 consumed $39,518 out of
pre-tax incomes of $47,507 (Bureau of Labor Statistics). 
ARMS data on the consumption and income of partici-
pating farm households also show the important effect
of the life cycle on household consumption decisions
(fig. 6). On average, farmers of all ages are net savers.
Older and younger households consume more of their
income, while middle-aged households (in their peak 
earning years) consume a smaller share. Note that the
lifecycle framework does not predict identical consump-
tion levels across all ages; rather, it predicts differences
in the share of income consumed versus saved.
Decoupled Payments Increase Household
Consumption Expenditures
In theory, income transfers can be expected to increase
spending by making consumption more affordable.
They raise lifetime income and reduce the rate of sav-
ing required to pay for future consumption, especially
if the payments are perceived to be permanent. 
Consistent with theory, ARMS data show that across
most of the farm household income distribution, farm
households that received PFCs in 2001 consumed more
than nonparticipating farm households of similar income
levels (fig. 7).5 Among the lowest income farm house-
holds, recipients’ median consumption expenditure
(regionally adjusted to reflect cost-of-living differences)
exceeded nonrecipients’ by about $2,500. Differences
tended to be greatest in the middle of the income distri-
bution. There was no difference in spending at the high-
est income quintile, presumably because the payments
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4The "consumer unit" is based on the BLS definition of financial depend-
ency within a household and therefore absolute consumption and income is
not comparable to the household consumption and income estimates from
the U.S. Census Bureau and USDA. Rather, compare the shares of income
allocated toward consumption.
Figure 6
Household life cycle influences participants' spending habits
Dollars
























5This increase in consumption expenditure shown by ARMS is also con-
sistent with the views expressed by farm managers in a panel convened by
Johnston and Schertz in 1997. The managers reported that payments were
being used for a variety of purposes, but there were no indications that
recipients were saving them to offset periods of low income or for a possi-
ble end to subsidies in 2003. had proportionately smaller impacts on household
income and wealth.
Consumption expenditure patterns across income levels
also suggest that decoupled payments may substitute for
precautionary saving for farm households. While some
spending can be expected to adjust as income varies, a
certain level of household spending would be maintained
to preserve continuity in accustomed living standards,
perhaps by drawing down precautionary savings or
borrowing. The gap in spending between participants
and nonparticipants in most income quintiles may
include use of the payments to sustain consumption
levels during temporary downswings in income.
Farm Households Invest On- and Off-Farm
Farmer decisions to save a portion of their decoupled
payment can increase the supply of investment capital
to the farm business. However, the decision of how
much to save out of income is closely tied to the deci-
sion on where to invest savings. 
Households allocate their savings to investment asset
portfolios that consist of one or more assets. Portfolio
diversification is a means for a household to maximize
the total expected returns on its investments by balanc-
ing the risk and expected return that characterize each
asset. Farmers, like other investors, can be expected to
follow an economic criterion of equalizing risk and
tax-adjusted rates of return across investments. An
asset offering a higher rate of return, adjusted for risk
and taxes, than that earned by the existing asset portfo-
lio presents an opportunity to increase overall profits
by reallocating investments across the portfolio until
all assets have the same return.
ARMS asset portfolio data for 1999 show that farm
households receiving PFCs exercise considerable
choice in investing their savings. Participating house-
holds had an average asset portfolio of $768,710,
while total debt averaged $108,679. (The difference is
the average net worth of farm households, equal to
$660,031.) Most (about 70 percent) of the portfolio
consisted of farm assets, including land (the largest
asset on average), buildings, machinery, and invento-
ries (fig. 8). Nonfarm assets include the dwelling in
which the producer’s family lives. Participants’ asset
portfolios also have a significant (and growing) pres-
ence of nonfarm assets that include stocks and bonds,
retirement assets, and liquid assets such as savings
accounts and certificates of deposit. Nonfarm assets
made up an average of about 30 percent of recipient
households’ investment portfolios in 1999.
PFC recipients’ farm operations account for a large
share of their existing stock of investment, but surveys
indicate that farm households’ investment choice at the
margin, with any additional funds saved, would differ
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Income quintile
Note: Quintiles are constructed by dividing total income (farm and nonfarm) of all U.S. farm households into five equal-sized groups, with 
quintile 1 containing the lowest income households and quintile 5 containing the highest income households.
Source: ARMS, 2001.from current portfolio shares. The 1988 FCRS asked
U.S. farm households how they would spend a one-
time $25,000 windfall. At that time, farm households
would have willingly allocated more savings out of
additional income to off-farm investments. Farmers
reported that 55 percent of the $25,000 would have
been saved, with most of the amount going to invest-
ments that were not part of the farm operation.
There are reasons to expect that farm households may
be unlikely to allocate PFCs toward additional invest-
ments to their farm business. Foremost, decoupled pay-
ments do not increase prices or market returns on invest-
ment in farming so do not increase demand for farm
investment. It is also likely that in the case of a house-
hold’s onfarm assets, the rate of return on its invest-
ment is sensitive to the quantity invested, and the
scope for profitable new investments may be limited.
In contrast, nonfarm investment markets, particularly
financial markets, are much larger and households are
less likely to be concerned that additional allocations
to nonfarm investments will diminish marginal returns.
How Decoupled Payments Can 
Increase Onfarm Investment
Because a decoupled payment does not directly change
the price of agricultural commodities, it does not change
the rate of return earned by agricultural assets or labor.
Thus, it provides no price incentives for a reallocation
of existing investment. Beneficiaries that desire to invest
a portion of their payments can allocate it to the port-
folio asset that best meets their economic objectives,
drawing on the full range of onfarm and off-farm
investment opportunities that exist for PFC recipients.
In some cases, producers may have objectives that
extend beyond equalizing rates of return across a port-
folio. Producers receiving PFC payments may invest in
additional capital for their farm operations not because
the investment will bring a high return but because it
will allow them to offset a portion of current income,
an option allowable with some restrictions under the
U.S. tax code. Producers in this case are following the
portfolio rule as above but are now equalizing the
after-tax rate of return to assets. Payment recipients
may also choose to pursue unprofitable farming prac-
tices, at least in the short term, because the additional
cash flow allows them to ignore market price signals.
These producers may derive some nonpecuniary return
from farming, have unwarranted and optimistic price
expectations, or their investments outside the existing
portfolio may carry high transaction costs. 
Farm investment can also increase if the supply of credit
increases. Lenders may perceive recipients as being
more credit worthy as a result of PFCs because the pay-
ments increase collateral values for land owners and
increase repayment capacity, reducing lenders’exposure
to risk of loan defaults. This could lead financial institu-
tions to lend capital at a lower interest rate or alterna-
tively to lend more capital than otherwise at the exist-
ing interest rate. Note, however, that household credit
supply for consumer purchases would also increase.
So far, our discussion of investment portfolios has
described how producers react to efficient capital mar-
kets. However, capital markets may have imperfections,
such as incomplete information of lenders about borrow-
ers, causing some producers to be credit constrained. At
the prevailing interest rate, farmers are unable to take
advantage of profitable farm investment opportunities.
Under these conditions, PFC payments enable increased
onfarm investment. 
No Evidence of Aggregate Investment 
Effects in U.S. Agriculture
As a practical matter, it is difficult to measure the
above effects of PFC payments on recipients’ farm
investment because many of the investment demand
and supply effects we describe occur simultaneously.
We can, however, compare the farm and nonfarm port-
folios of PFC recipients with those of farm households
not receiving a PFC payment. This allows us to deter-
mine whether the scenarios where lump-sum payments
would lead to increased agricultural investment appear
to be reflected in aggregate behavior. The rationale for
controlling for program participation status is not
because the groups are similar to each other—there are
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Figure 8
Farm households with PFCs allocate savings 
across an investment portfolio 
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Other nonfarm, 6%basic differences in farms producing program crops
versus other farms—but because the capital market
conditions in which these farms operate are similar. If
capital market imperfections exist and are significant,
then it would be expected that PFC participant farm
households would be unlikely to hold nonfarm assets
in their portfolios. However, figure 9 shows that the
nonfarm assets held by participating and nonparticipat-
ing farm households are similar.
Another way to test for credit constraints among pro-
gram participants is to compare investment in farm
equipment per acre across high- and low-cost participat-
ing farm operations. Costs of production can be expect-
ed to correlate with the presence of credit constraints
since lenders consider production costs in their lending
decisions. If credit constraints are significant, it would
be expected that high-cost operations might have been
forced over time to invest less in machinery and equip-
ment compared with low-cost operations. ARMS data
show no significant differences in capital stocks among
high- and low-cost operations receiving PFC payments
(fig. 10). Investment in machinery and equipment per
acre of land farmed was virtually the same for low-cost
operations ($146) as it was for high-cost operations
($149), and their land values were also comparable. 
In addition, if there were credit constraints, decoupled
payments would allow program participants to replace
machinery and equipment more often than nonpartici-
pants. Although the composition of physical assets was
different for program participants versus nonparticipants
and participants’per acre stock of investment in machin-
ery and equipment was higher ($144 versus $106), the
rate of replacement as indicated by the ratio of new pur-
chases to existing stock was similar, 11 percent. Replace-
ment rates can influence production because newer
equipment tends to embody technological changes that
enhance productivity. Because replacement rates were
similar, the PFC payments did not appear to stimulate
added investment in machinery and equipment.
The U.S. farm sector is composed of farms with differ-
ent debt loads and debt-carrying capacity. Some are
likely to be credit-constrained farms so that at least
some proportion of U.S. producers will respond to
PFCs by increasing their farm investments. However,
ARMS data show that most participating U.S. farms
are likely to be financially stable and therefore an
inability to take on more debt does not seem to be a
concern in aggregate. In 2001, about 60 percent held
debt that represented less than 40 percent of their debt
repayment capacity, while only about one-fifth of
farms carried debt representing 80 percent or more of
their capacity (fig. 11). Because this measure excludes
nonfarm sources of income or assets, it is likely a low
estimate of debt capacity since the calculation includes
only cash-flow from the farm business. 
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Figure 9




















 Nonparticipants  ParticipantsDecoupled Payments, Credit 
Constraints, and Farm Structure
The effects of government payments on the structure of
U.S. agriculture—the number of small or family farms
relative to large, commercial farms—has been part of
the public debate over farm subsidies. The effect of
decoupled payments in preserving smaller farms cannot
be predicted on the basis of economic theory. On the
one hand, payments could provide high-cost producers
with the liquidity they need to remain in operation.
This would slow consolidation since about two-thirds
of PFC-recipient farms in the United States are high-
or medium-cost intermediate or rural residence farms.
On the other hand, the payments could provide low-cost
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Figure 10
Among participants, there is no evidence of capital constraint (investment per acre) 
related to cost of production
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Debt repayment capacity utilizationproducers with the liquidity to buy out high-cost pro-
ducers and, at the same time, maximize the value of
the land assets that high-cost producers offer for sale.
Large, commercial farms tend to be low- to medium-
cost producers, and these farms account for about two-
thirds of production (table 3). 
Recent data on U.S. farm structure show no distinctive
changes in farm sizes associated with the introduction
of decoupled payments (Hoppe and Korb). The trend
toward larger farm sizes, most evident in livestock
enterprises that typically receive very limited payments,
has been continuous since 1935. The largest increase
in sales between 1982 and 1997 occurred in very large
farms with sales of $1-$5 million. These farms are
mostly associated with production of crops such as hor-
ticulture. Farms specializing in cash grain production
account for only 10 percent of all farms in this sales
class. Additionally, the share of farms operating more
than 500 acres increased in the past 10 years, but this
has been the case since the 1940s, with no evident
break since the introduction of decoupled payments. 
Risk Attitudes Influence 
Investment Decisions
Risk is a fundamental component of agricultural busi-
ness. There are many sources of risk, including price and
yield risk, risks associated with changes in government
policy, and personal injury or health risks. The 1996
ARMS indicates that risk in general is a concern for
most producers, although marked differences exist in
producer perceptions of the primary sources of risk for
their business. Producers of program crops, including
wheat, corn, soybeans, tobacco, and cotton, are con-
cerned more about yield and price variability than
other categories of risk, while producers of vegetables,
greenhouse crops, cattle, and poultry are most con-
cerned about changes in laws and regulations. Across
all farms, producers are most concerned about changes
in laws and regulations (institutional risk), variability
in crop yields or livestock output (production risk),
and uncertainty in commodity prices (Harwood et al.). 
The debate on decoupled payments has focused on the
potential for the increase in income and wealth of par-
ticipants to increase the level of risk they are willing to
assume, which might result in higher levels of agricul-
tural production. Various case studies that measured
farmers’ attitudes toward risk in specific enterprises
have generally found that farmers are risk averse and
that risk tolerance increases as their wealth increases
(Chavas and Holt, 1990, 1996; Saha et al.; Pope and
Just). Using relationships between wealth and acreage
planted estimated by Chavas and Holt (1990), Westcott
and Young report that increased wealth from decou-
pled PFC payments may have increased total agricul-
tural land use in the United States by 225,000-725,000
acres (less than 0.3 percent annually). 
Despite the prominence of risk aversion in the debate on
decoupled payments, the link between changes in risk
tolerance and production is not yet well understood.
ARMS data on participating farms shows that many
producers use market mechanisms, such as forward
contracts and hedging, to directly manage their risk
exposure, suggesting that risk aversion is not solely
addressed directly through production decisions. In
fact, ARMS data show that use of these market mecha-
nisms increases with the level of wealth, which seems
to further weaken the link between the decoupled pay-
ment and production via risk. Furthermore, the diversi-
fication observed in the investment portfolios held by
participating farms suggest that changes in risk attitudes
can be expected to be evidenced throughout their port-
folios, as holdings are readjusted to maintain equal-
ized, risk-adjusted rates of return. Much more needs to
be learned about the relationship between wealth and
risk attitudes and the household’s risk management
strategies before we can draw firm conclusions about
the risk effect of decoupled payments on production.
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Table 3—Distribution of PFC-participating farms by cost level
Commercial Intermediate Rural-residence
Cost level Population Production Population Production Population Production
Percent
High cost 2 3 18 5 20 2
Medium cost 9 24 21 13 8 2
Low cost 9 42 9 9 4 1
Note: Population and production shares each sum to 100 across farm types and cost.
Source: ARMS, 2001.Decoupled Payments
and Farm Labor
Farm labor market effects have not been as prominent as
investment and risk effects in the public debate over
agricultural income transfers; however, they also con-
tribute to understanding whether PFC payments affect
production. Increased income and wealth increase a
household’s ability to “consume” leisure and reduce
work hours, working against the objectives of some
income transfer programs if they discourage labor
force participation.6 Changes in the labor and leisure
choices of farm households due to decoupled payments
can potentially reduce farm labor supply and aggregate
farm output, an outcome that would tend to support
world commodity prices. On the other hand, farmers
are sometimes perceived to be pursuing a vocation or a
lifestyle choice, and it might be argued that it would
be unlikely for them to change their onfarm hours as
their wealth increases. They may even increase onfarm
work if it were considered to have leisure attributes.
Decoupled Payments and 
Recipients’ Farm Labor Supply
One-third of farm households receiving PFC payments
work entirely on farm, but most participating households
work in varying amounts both on- and off-farm (fig. 12).
Any adjustments in their leisure hours will reflect
attempts to optimally allocate total labor hours across
the two job markets.7 This is a “tripartite” household
labor supply decision—the allocation of hours among
leisure and onfarm and off-farm work. Any increase in
hours of leisure by an operator or spouse leads to com-
pensating changes in hours worked in onfarm and/or
off-farm work.
As decoupled payments increase household income
and hours of leisure, hours worked might be expected
to decline onfarm and off-farm. However, it is easy to
imagine circumstances that would lead all adjustments
to occur in just one of the household’s jobs. For exam-
ple, off-farm labor could be “lumpy” in that it may be
difficult to make small adjustments in work hours, per-
haps due to seasonality or eligibility for benefits.
However, analysis of ARMS data on participants’
household labor supply shows wide variation in the
share of hours worked per week off-farm, suggesting
that off-farm employment is flexible enough to allow
for changes in response to an increase in leisure hours
due to an income transfer (Ahearn, El-Osta, and
Dewbre). Likewise, onfarm work hours might be
inflexible, resulting in all adjustment to increased
leisure occurring in off-farm work.
Analysis of the leisure and work choices of participating
U.S. farmers during 1998-2000, excluding those on 
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6Leisure is a difficult concept to measure. Nonwork hours are often aggre-
gated into a single category called “leisure” that in fact typically includes
many activities that are not purely recreational, such as self-maintenance and,
particularly for women, household chores and childcare. Some labor econ-
omists use instead the terms “nonmarket activities” or “nonmarket time.”
Figure 12
PFC recipient households show diversity in share of total hours worked on farm
Percent of recipient households










Farm labor as share of total household labor hours
Source: ARMS, 2001.
7See Findeis for a theoretical treatment of farm households that are
linked to off-farm labor markets, in which she shows that an income trans-
fer reduces total work time.retirement or lifestyle farms, shows that an increase in
farm household incomes from decoupled payments was
associated with greater use of leisure time (Dewbre and
Mishra). Operators and their spouses whose only job was
agricultural production reduced their annual agricultur-
al labor by 1.4 hours per $1,000 of PFC payments, while
those who worked off-farm as well reduced their agricul-
tural labor by 1 hour per $1,000 of PFC payments
(table 4). Because the average PFC payment was about
$9,000, the labor market effects found in the Dewbre and
Mishra study are extremely small. Furthermore, the sub-
stitution of capital for labor in production may also occur
and further minimize the negative production impact. 
The Life Cycle in Farm Labor and Ownership
Certain caveats apply to the labor market analysis just
described. Foremost is that these aggregate farm labor
supply effects are composed of differential responses
by households with different age structures. U.S. farm
households receiving decoupled payments exhibit a
strong life-cycle pattern in their hours of work onfarm
and their pattern of land ownership. Hours worked per
year increase from early adulthood, peaking in early
middle age, and declining after the age of 45 (fig. 13).
Similar to spending and savings behavior, a household’s
position in its life cycle is a significant determinant of
its labor supply response to changes in income. Other
things being equal, the wealth effect on demand for
leisure is greater for older workers than for younger
workers who face a longer time horizon over which to
provide for lifetime consumption out of their current
earnings and wealth. 
In 2001, 43 percent of U.S. farmers receiving decoupled
payments were age 55 or older compared with only 8
percent under age 35. Both life cycle considerations and
tax treatment create incentives for older recipients to
reduce their active involvement in agriculture and
increase their leisure. Landowners can capture the full
value of decoupled payments either by remaining active
operators or by increasing rental rates on the acreage
they rent out. Because earned income is taxed more
heavily than passive income, and in some cases may
reduce benefits from social security, PFCs create
incentives for older landowners to reduce their active
role in farming (Novak and Duffy).
ARMS data show that, as aging farmers exit active farm-
ing, they often rent their land to younger producers. This
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Table 4—Changes in onfarm work due to 
PFC payments
Change in onfarm work








Source: Dewbre and Mishra, 2002.
Figure 13
The rise and fall of PFC participants' onfarm labor hours, population share, and 
production over the life cycle
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Source: ARMS, 2001.contributes to the divergent age structure of U.S. land
ownership relative to production. The life-cycle pattern
evident in figure 14 shows that land rental tracks pro-
duction more closely than does land ownership.
Farmers accumulate assets as they age, and land plays
an important role in the asset portfolio. The market for
base acres has, in effect, resulted in a large share of
U.S. farm production being accounted for by younger
tenant-operators who produce for market returns and
pass program benefits through to older landlords.
Another important determinant of farm household
labor supply is the long-term decline in the labor-
intensity of U.S. agriculture. This trend, in which the
capital-intensity of U.S. agriculture has increased, pro-
vides ample evidence of the ease with which capital
can be substituted for exiting farm labor, at least in the
long run (fig. 15). Factor substitutability means that,
over time, any shortrun effects of decoupled payments
on farm labor supply would have impacts of a propor-
tionately smaller scale on output.
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Figure 14
Farmland rental markets transfer production opportunities across generations
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Source: Ahearn et al.Effects of Decoupled Farm
Payments on Aggregate
Agricultural Supply
This section integrates our findings on the consumption,
savings, and investment behaviors of program partici-
pant households in a simulation analysis of payment
effects on aggregate production. Decoupled payments
influence recipient household levels of consumption,
savings, investment, and work effort—choices that can
change the resources the households make available to
farm operations.
Production Effects With Efficient Markets
The links between decoupled payments and agricultural
production are indirect and depend on household
responses to the payment. These indirect links are
strengthened when factor market failures or rigidities
create incentives or conditions that favor agricultural
activities over alternatives. Gardner (1992) argues that
the most compelling evidence of efficiency in U.S.
agricultural factor markets has been the elimination of
the income gap between farm and nonfarm households.
The mobility of farm labor through exit or engagement
in off-farm employment has contributed to the equal-
ization of farm and nonfarm income. Increased use by
farm households of off-farm investment opportunities
has helped to equalize rates of return on farm and non-
farm capital assets. The cautious borrowing and lend-
ing behavior of farmers and lenders since the 1980’s
farm credit crisis has also strengthened agricultural
capital markets and helped to equilibrate the supply
and demand for farm credit (Collender). These views
on the efficiency of U.S. agricultural factor markets
are consistent with the economic circumstances of
PFC recipient households as described by ARMS data. 
To estimate the production effects of decoupled pay-
ments, we use a dynamic, intertemporal CGE model that
simulates the efficient functioning of U.S. agricultural
factor markets. The model is used to simulate perma-
nent, annual decoupled payments of $6 billion, approxi-
mately the amount of decoupled payments in 1997, the
model base year. The simulation finds that the payments
have no effects on agricultural production in either the
short run or the long run. However, the increase in
household asset values leads to a small and permanent
increase in farm household consumption levels (0.8 per-
cent higher than in the absence of payments) and a
decline in the proportion of income being saved, but
with no effects on agricultural investment. (See box,
“Production Effects of Coupled Farm Subsidies.)
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The modest production impacts of decoupled payments can be
put into perspective by comparing these impacts with the
effects of coupled U.S. subsidies. The two largest coupled sub-
sidy programs provided during the FAIR Act were the market-
ing loan program (coupled to price) and crop insurance premi-
ums (input subsidies). 
U.S. marketing loan benefits ranged from around $5 billion to
over $8 billion annually in the last several years. When com-
modity prices are below commodity loan rates, program bene-
fits augment market receipts. Marketing loans in effect provide
a per unit revenue floor, and truncate the lower end of the dis-
tribution of expected revenues. By reducing variability and
increasing mean expected producer revenue, the loan program
creates an incentive to produce program crops. The U.S. mar-
keting loan program is estimated to have increased the annual
acreage planted to eight major field crops by 2 to 4 million
acres (about 1-2 percent) (Westcott and Price).
The U.S. crop insurance program expended about $1.5 billion in
2001, about two-thirds the value of the $4.1 billion in 2001 PFC
payments. Premium subsidies are proportional to premiums.
Thus, since premiums are higher for riskier crops, the absolute
levels of crop subsidy are highest for those crops. As a result,
this premium structure encourages the production of riskier crops
and production in riskier regions. Crop insurance subsidies are
estimated to have added about 960,000 acres (about 0.4 percent)
to annual production of eight major field crops, with wheat and
cotton expanding the most (Young, Vandeveer, and Schnepf).
Why are supply responses to coupled programs relatively low?
For decades, there has been analysis of the low supply response
of agriculture, which contributes to large swings in commodity
price when demand conditions change. The roles of fixed costs,
inelastic factor supply, technological conditions, and the frag-
mented and competitive structure of the sector in creating low
supply response were noted by Johnson in 1950. Climate and
land characteristics place physical limits on aggregate supply
and crop substitutability. Supply has also been influenced his-
torically by government programs that have interfered with
market price signals and constrained planting decisions. 
Recent estimates of aggregate and crop supply response, such as
Lin et al., show that U.S. crop supply responsiveness to price has
increased. The increase in acreage supply response has been espe-
cially large with respect to cross-prices, meaning that farmers
have become more flexible in changing their crop mix in response
to changes in relative prices. Changes in farm programs have
been an important factor allowing greater supply response;
nonetheless, aggregate supply response remains inelastic.
Production Effects of Coupled Farm SubsidiesThe payments also lead to a permanent increase of about
8 percent in aggregate U.S. farmland values. Other
recent ERS research has estimated that all farm pro-
grams, coupled and decoupled payments combined,
increased land values for program crops by about 20
percent, or $62 billion (Barnard et al.). Although the
two estimates result from different economic models,
their results are roughly proportional in magnitude.
PFCs accounted for about one-third of farm payments
during the FAIR Act, and our simulation includes all
farmland. Note that the capitalization of payments into
land values does not itself distort cropping patterns,
except through a barrier to entry into horticulture,
because planting flexibility allows for idling or shift-
ing production to nonprogram crops. However, the
higher land values associated with cropland (including
idling) likely means that the exit of base acres into
nonagricultural uses, such as residential or commercial
use, has slowed. 
Production Effects With 
Capital Market Constraints
Overall, the labor and capital markets in which U.S.
farm households operate may be efficient, but they are
unlikely to operate perfectly or to be perfect for all
individual farmers. Inefficiencies in U.S. capital markets,
in which some or many farmers are capital constrained
and would choose to use the payment to increase
onfarm investments, generate the strongest potential
link between the payments and production. As a sensi-
tivity experiment, we assume the extreme case in
which decoupled payments, net of taxes and consump-
tion, and assuming zero pass-through from tenants to
landlords, are fully invested in agriculture. Under this
scenario, if all farmers are unable to exercise portfolio
choice in allocating their investments, or if they are
credit constrained and invest only in agriculture, pay-
ments would still have a minimal (0.1-0.2 percent)
impact on aggregate production through 15 years, with 
smaller impacts in subsequent years. If payments are
continued indefinitely, the largest effects of the pay-
ments would be to increase land values (fig. 16). 
Decoupled payments to credit-constrained farmers
would increase capital investment in farming by, at most,
0.25 percent in the short run over what would otherwise
be invested. Excess investment in agriculture is self-cor-
recting in the long run, since it pushes down returns to
agricultural capital. This reduces the farm household’s
incentive to save and invest and increases current con-
sumption, resulting in a longrun increase in farm invest-
ment of about 0.1 percent.
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Figure 16
Even if decoupled payments are invested only in 
agriculture, they would have small and declining 
effects on investment and output, but lasting 
effects on land values  
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Decoupled payments were introduced into the U.S.
farm support program relatively recently. These house-
hold income transfers represent a significant departure
from the commodity programs that traditionally have
been used to support income from farming. Because
the effects of income transfers are evidenced through-
out a household’s spending, saving, and work choices,
analysis of decoupled payments’ impacts on the farm
operation must also take into account this broader
household context. The research findings in this report
represent an initial effort to understand U.S. farm
household choices about consumption, savings, invest-
ment, and employment in response to changes in
income and wealth due to decoupled payments, taking
into account the diversity of farm households.
Detailed survey data on farm households’farm and non-
farm activities are now becoming available through
ARMS. As a result, the research questions posed in this
report are certain to become an active area of agricultural
policy research and analysis. Some issues for analysis,
in addition to more indepth treatment of the questions
addressed in this report, include how wealth effects
work in a dynamic setting. For example, how might
negative wealth effects work if subsidies are removed
and farm asset values decline? Are markets that capi-
talize future payments also efficient in capitalizing
policy reform? What is the time lag associated with
payment capitalization, and how does producer uncer-
tainty about policy affect the rate of capitalization?
Other research issues include the role of taxes and the
nature of transactions within the farm household that
lead to observed household behavior. 
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This examination of the U.S. experience with decou-
pled payments in the FAIR Act offers some  perspec-
tives on such payments for the WTO negotiations on
agriculture. It describes a general conceptual frame-
work for analyzing the links between decoupled pay-
ments, farm households, and farm production deci-
sions. It examines the impacts of the U.S. PFC pay-
ments on recipient households, taking into account that
most engage in both farm and nonfarm economic
activities. Finally, it identifies areas in which more
research is needed if the impacts of income transfers
on farm households, farm production, and world mar-
kets are to be better understood. 
Analysis of farm household survey data in this study
indicates that U.S. decoupled payments have increased
the level of overall well-being of households that
receive PFC payments, where well-being is defined
broadly to encompass income, wealth, and consump-
tion as well as how people choose to spend their time.
Households that receive payments have higher levels
of spending out of income than nonrecipient house-
holds with similar income levels and are better able to
smooth consumption during periods of low income.
The payments have also led to small reductions in
households’ work hours, including their onfarm labor.
PFC recipients were also found to allocate a large
share of their investments to assets unrelated to agri-
cultural production. This indicates that nonfarm invest-
ments are likely to play an important role in their allo-
cation of savings from PFC payments as well as in
their adjustments to any changes in risk attitudes
attributable to the payments. In addition, aggregate
data on investment by participating households show
no evidence of higher rates of onfarm investment or
capital replacement compared with nonparticipant
households. These findings, together with the results
of a simulation of a U.S. decoupled payments program,
indicate that the PFC cash payments changed and
increased recipients’ well-being but in ways that can
be expected to have minimal links to farm production 
levels. The main impact of decoupled payments is
likely on land values. These were shown to have
increased about 8 percent due to the payments. 
An implication of these conclusions for global agricul-
tural negotiations is that market context matters. The
case for policy intervention is often based on an actual
or perceived distortion in agricultural markets. Some
subsidies are designed expressly to effect economic
outcomes by offsetting existing distortions. Likewise,
the impacts of decoupled programs can be expected to
be influenced by their setting. Decoupled payments are
more likely to have production impacts when market
and institutional conditions, such as farm credit con-
straints, weak financial systems, and rigid labor mar-
kets, create strong links between the payments and a
household’s farm business decisions. Absent these
market failures, payment recipients have only to
decide what to do with their income and wealth trans-
fer, allowing their decisions about how to allocate
decoupled payments to be largely divorced from their
production decisions.
There is little evidence today of market failures in U.S.
agricultural factor markets, although they have provid-
ed an important rationale for farm policy since the
1930s. They have continued to provide a rationale for
government intervention even as the U.S. farm sector
has gradually undergone profound change. Efficiencies
achieved through the maturation and industrialization
of the sector have created competitive markets in farm
and nonfarm labor and capital, and led to the economic
well-being of agricultural producers being today little
different than that of the general population financing
the payments. This transformation of the farm econo-
my has important implications for the way in which
U.S. farm households are affected by farm programs,
in particular, enabling decoupled payments to transfer
income and wealth with minimal impacts on produc-
tion. This allocation of program benefits helps decou-
pled payments to meet trade policy objectives, but
may be less compatible with domestic policy goals of
increasing returns to agricultural producers. 
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the Computable General
Equilibrium Model
The inter-temporal computable general equilibrium
model underlying the results presented in this report is
briefly described here. The model depicts an open econ-
omy in which agents consume and produce at each
instant of time a manufactured good, an agricultural
good, and services. The manufacturing and agricultural
goods can be traded internationally, and the manufactur-
ing good can also be allocated to capital. There are three
factors of production: land, labor and capital. Labor
services are not traded internationally and domestic
residents own the entire stock of domestic assets. All
three sectors employ labor and capital services with
production characterized by constant returns to scale
technologies. In addition, agriculture employs land.
Households are of two types: urban households that do
not own land and other, mostly rural, households that
own land. The only feature distinguishing household
type is their endowments of labor, and the assets capi-
tal and agricultural land. They otherwise have identical
preferences although their levels of expenditure and
savings are endogenous to the model. 
The model is inter-temporal, and traces adjustments
over an approximately 50-year time period. To estab-
lish the baseline equilibrium time path for the econo-
my, labor and land productivity and population are
assumed to grow exogenously over time. Households
maximize the discounted value of their utility subject
to an inter-temporal budget constraint, stock of assets,
and limits on borrowing. If, at an instant of time,
returns to capital are relatively high, the household
foregoes expenditures to accumulate assets for future 
consumption, with the magnitude of impact depending
on their elasticity of inter-temporal substitution. The
household’s utility is measured as a geometrically dis-
counted flow of future utility.
The model is calibrated to 1997 data and solved under
the assumption of no PFC payments. Then, PFC pay-
ments are added to the model. They are presumed to
be permanent, annual lump-sum transfers from non-
land-owning households to land-owning households,
and are assumed to be tied to land ownership. Two
versions of the model are used in this report. In one,
the arbitrage condition between assets is presumed to
hold. From the household’s perspective, returns to its
savings are maximized when the income from one unit
of income invested in capital is equal to the return of a
unit of income invested in land. Because preferences
of both household types are assumed to be identical
and homothetic, the negative effects on urban house-
hold consumption are just offset through the positive
effects on rural households. In the first experiment,
therefore, the only variable with aggregate effects is
the price of land. 
In the second scenario, or sensitivity experiment, the
market for agricultural capital can clear at a rate of
return different than the capital employed in the manu-
facturing and services sectors of the economy.
Effectively, this assumes segmented capital markets in
which the non-land-owning urban households do not
invest in agricultural capital over the period of analy-
sis, and the land-owning households are restricted to
investment in agricultural capital. In the agriculture
sector, PFC payments initially increase investment in
agriculture, but declining returns causes households to
increase their consumption relative to savings over
time and reduce their agricultural investment. 
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